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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The social agenda of feminism and the capitalistic nature of the 
American workforce have seldom converged.1 However, in an attempt 
to empower women in the workplace and prevent them from being sub-
ject to hostile work environments, feminists have agreed with many 
classical business theorists in positing that the workforce should be a 
‘sterile’ environment, void of any expression of sexuality.2 As a result 
of feminist efforts and uncertainty about how to interpret the language 
in Title VII regarding sex discrimination and how it pertains to sexual 
harassment,3 the normative corporate practice has been to eliminate 
sexual interaction in every way possible.4 A number of workplaces 
have policies against vertical or horizontal dating;5 some go as far as                                                                                                                                  
 * Thanks to Professor Courtney Cahill, Donald Hinkle Professor of Law at the Florida 
State University College of Law for providing me with the resources and guidance to develop 
my arguments. I would also like to thank Nora Bailey for her unwavering support and con-
fidence in me. 
 1. See Ann Ferguson & Rosemary Hennessy, Feminist Perspectives on Class and 
Work, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., Winter 2010, at 3-11, http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/win2010/entries/feminism-class/ [https://perma.cc/9KN9-MVA7] (explaining the 
progression of the workplace and the evolution of feminist theories about the role of women 
in work settings; namely, that women have been systematically excluded and oppressed be-
cause of their perceived status as caregivers not fit for the skilled and intellectual tasks that 
business demands). 
 2. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2063 (2003). 
 3. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (explaining that in order 
for sexual harassment to be actionable under Title VII, the victim’s working conditions must 
create an abusive working environment). 
 4. Schultz, supra note 2, at 2064. 
 5. E.g., WALMART, GLOBAL STATEMENT OF ETHICS 13-14 (2017), https://www.walmartethics.com/ 
uploadedFiles/Content/U.S.%20-%20English.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC9L-62KM] (noting that 
relationships between employees and suppliers should be limited to avoid conflicts of interest 
and that employees should not have relationships with other employees). As discussed 
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to constrain interactions between male and female coworkers to a 
strictly public sphere to avoid any implication of inappropriate behav-
ior. As Professor Vicki Schultz notes, businesses and government en-
tities have taken an extreme, prophylactic approach to the apparent 
strict liability standard of sexual harassment in the workplace.6 
 It is generally known that business entities have complex rules about 
interpersonal interactions among employees. Anyone who has endured 
an orientation for a job involving a human resources component has 
surely noticed that, aside from encouraging workers to report theft or 
negligence committed by fellow employees, orientations spend a consid-
erable amount of time discussing sexual harassment policies and, at 
times, even quizzing prospective employees regarding these policies. 
The popular television sitcom, The Office, satirizes this phenomenon 
throughout the show; it overtly sheds light on the topic of corporate sex-
ual harassment policies in an episode aptly entitled “Sexual Harass-
ment.”7 In the episode, several male characters are depicted making 
sexist comments that are derogatory to women within earshot of female 
coworkers and using homophobic slang in the presence of a gay male 
coworker.8 One employee resigned because he felt sexually harassed.9  
 Not surprisingly, these antics incited human resources to hold a 
meeting to revisit the company’s sexual harassment policy; the corpo-
ration even sent an attorney down to the branch to ensure that the 
company would not be held liable for sexual harassment.10 During the 
ensuing human resources training, the human resources representa-
tive makes it clear that office relationships should be immediately dis-
closed.11 The manager then goes into a series of hypotheticals regard-
ing office relationships and displays of intimacy in the workplace, cov-
ering the right to display pictures of family members on one’s desk, 
overt same-sex relationships in the workplace, and whether it is okay 
to discuss personal intimacy at work.12 After speaking with his corpo-
rate superior and the company’s attorney, the manager comes to the 
                                                                                                                                 
herein, vertical dating is the act of dating one’s superior, and horizontal dating is the act of 
dating one’s co-worker who has the same level of authority.  
 6. Schultz, supra note 2, at 2101-02 (describing the focus of the “cultural sensitivity 
approach” that human resources divisions at many corporations observe when addressing 
sexual harassment. As Schultz notes, “It doesn’t matter whether anyone intended to discrim-
inate, as it’s all a question of whether someone was offended.”). 
 7. The Office: Sexual Harassment (NBC television broadcast Sept. 27, 2005). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id.  
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conclusion that he cannot be friends with his coworkers if he wishes to 
comply with the corporate sexual harassment policy.13 
 While this episode is designed to be light-hearted commentary 
about what can happen in a poorly managed company, it illustrates 
many important points on both sides of the argument about whether 
or not sexuality has a place in the workplace. Most notably, corpora-
tions are terrified of sexual harassment claims and will bend over 
backwards to ensure that their employees are in compliance with sex-
ual harassment policies.14 Another criticism of the sexual harassment 
regime depicted in the episode is that it tends to segregate men and 
women, preventing them from interacting with each other out of fear 
of sexual harassment claims and thus subjugating women to lower-
status roles with little hope of promotion.15 The episode also hints that 
blue collar workers (who are predominantly men) are perceived as 
crude and more prone to harassing behaviors, as indicated by the man-
ager going to predominantly male workers in the warehouse to learn 
dirty jokes.16 The prevailing theme of the episode, and of sexual har-
assment policies in businesses generally, is that sexuality in the work-
place should be strictly monitored and potentially eliminated if possible.17 
 Schultz hypothesizes that if the structure of the workplace were to 
change to promote systematic gender equality and integration, then 
the workplace would be more amenable to reasonable displays of sex-
uality (a trait that she suggests is immutable), and businesses could 
loosen their policies regarding sexual harassment.18 She proposes a 
sliding scale in which the standard of proof that the plaintiff in a sex-
ual harassment case must meet is proportional to the level of sex inte-
gration achieved by the company: the more integrated the workplace, 
the more the plaintiff will have to prove to establish sexual harass-
ment, and vice versa.19  
                                                                                                                                 
 13. Id.  
 14. See Schultz, supra note 2, at 2064. 
 15. Id. at 2134-35. 
 16. The Office: Sexual Harassment (NBC television broadcast Sept. 27, 2005). 
 17. See Schultz, supra note 2, at 2119-31 (discussing the approach that several human 
resources divisions take to policing intimacy in the workplace); The Office: Sexual Harass-
ment (NBC television broadcast Sept. 27, 2005). 
 18. Schultz, supra note 2, at 2191-93.  
 19. Id. at 2173-84 (positing that raising the standard of proof for a plaintiff to bring a 
sexual harassment claim in integrated workspaces would incentivize employers to attack the 
structural inequalities that produce sexual harassment; namely, the categorical relegation 
of women and gender non-conformists to lower-status work positions and restricting their 
interactions with those in higher positions in the company, who are most often cisgendered—
of a gender identity that is congruent with the sex that they were assigned at birth—men). 
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 Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad20 is a prime example of what can 
go wrong with workplace intimacy. In Smith, the plaintiff was allowed 
to date and subsequently marry a co-worker—specifically, a subordi-
nate.21 The marriage fell apart after the plaintiff had an affair with 
another co-worker.22 The plaintiff was then terminated in anticipation 
of the disruptive nature and decreased performance that his pending 
divorce would cause.23  
 This is a somewhat unique case because (as noted above) most em-
ployers have policies against such workplace relationships in order to 
circumvent any potential sex discrimination or sex harassment claims. 
Many employers will terminate one or both employees upon the dis-
covery of an intimate relationship to avoid the potential for a sex dis-
crimination claim due to preferential treatment or a sexual harass-
ment claim if one of the partners becomes disillusioned with the other 
if/when the relationship sours.24 There is also a concern about other 
employees bringing harassment claims against the dating couple be-
cause, due to the ambiguity of Title VII25 and existing jurisprudence, 
sexual harassment is a valid cause of action, regardless of the har-
asser’s intent, so long as a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s situation 
would feel harassed.26  
 While Professor Schultz posits a comprehensive and compelling 
case for the need for sexual expression in the workplace and how to 
reform business practices to allow it, her work precedes Obergefell v. 
Hodges,27 and does not address the affect her proposed solution might 
have on individuals who do not conform with sex and gender norms.28 
Thus, her work does not consider the complications to the current state 
of the law.  
 If, under this strict liability standard, the couple in Smith were 
same-sex and they offended a co-worker with their relationship, the 
co-worker would have a viable claim for sexual harassment under most 
corporate policies and might have a sex discrimination claim under                                                                                                                                   20. No. L-113-08, 2014 WL 2894924 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 27, 2014). 
 21. Id. at *1.  
 22. Id. at *2.  
 23. Id. at *9 (“The reason for the termination was the prospect of divorce and its pre-
sumed effects, not the spouses’ common employer.”). 
 24. See Sue Shellenbarger, Getting Fired for Dating a Co-Worker: Office Romance 
Comes Under Attack, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2004, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB107714343144933108 [https://perma.cc/B6EJ-SYMF] (providing anecdotal and 
statistical evidence of such policies against office romance).  
 25. See infra Part II.  
 26. See sources cited infra note 29. 
 27. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 28. See generally Schultz, supra note 2. 
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Title VII if the co-worker could show that the couple’s relationship rea-
sonably created a hostile work environment for the employee. As 
courts have noted, this is a subjective standard with many contrib-
uting factors.29 Considering the plaintiff’s at-will employment status 
in Smith,30 a typical corporation would have seriously reprimanded or 
fired him upon discovering his relationship with his wife.  
 As Professor Schultz discusses, this fear-induced hair trigger to fire 
employees to avoid sexual harassment claims can lead to further sex 
segregation in the workplace,31 thus perverting the intent behind the 
sex discrimination clause of Title VII. Under the current sexual har-
assment scheme, employers are incentivized to isolate men and women 
from each other in the workplace in order to avoid sexual harassment 
and increase productivity. However, this usually has the effect of keep-
ing women in subordinate positions with little hope for upward mobil-
ity.32 The sexual harassment regime also disadvantages those who do 
not conform to gender norms because stereotypes about their sexual 
behavior can create a lower threshold for ‘victims’ of sexual harass-
ment to feel offended by interactions with them that would otherwise 
be considered benign (e.g., a gay man puts his hand on a male co-
worker’s shoulder, or a lesbian female tells a female coworker that she 
looks cute). Interestingly, the ‘victim’s’ claim could give the alleged of-
fender a colorable claim for sexual orientation discrimination, but this 
is not a certainty because some courts have refused to acknowledge 
sexual orientation discrimination as a form of gender discrimination.33 
This small hypothetical is one example of the need for legislation that 
further clarifies the sex discrimination clause of Title VII.  
 The Obergefell decision, coupled with the finding of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that sexual orientation is                                                                                                                                  
 29. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (“Whatever 
evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct 
at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted 
‘discrimina[tion] . . . because of . . . sex.’ . . . [T]he objective severity of harassment should be 
judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all 
the circumstances.’ ” (citations omitted)); Dawson v. City of Westchester, 373 F.3d 265, 272 (2d. 
Cir. 2004) (“Courts look to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a plaintiff 
has established a hostile work environment claim, considering [multiple] factors . . . .”); Barnes 
v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (explaining that Congress meant for Title VII to 
be interpreted liberally in the interest of fairness and equal opportunity). 
 30. Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, No. L-113-08, 2014 WL 2894924, *1 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. June 27, 2014). 
 31. Schultz, supra note 2, at 2132. 
 32. Id. at 2131. 
 33. See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d. Cir. 2000) (“The law is well-
settled in this circuit and in all others to have reached the question that Simonton has no 
cause of action under Title VII because Title VII does not prohibit harassment or discrimi-
nation because of sexual orientation.”). 
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considered sex-based discrimination under Title VII,34 will likely lead 
to more visible same-sex intimacy in the workplace. This will add an 
entirely new dimension to sex discrimination claims. What would it 
look like if an openly gay man worked at a company that refused to 
serve same-sex couples? Presuming that this would offend him or 
make him feel uncomfortable because of his employer’s overt views 
against the lesbian, bisexual, gay, transsexual, and queer/questioning 
(LBGTQ) community, would he have a claim for sexual orientation-
based harassment? The state of the sexual harassment regime today 
suggests that he would. Paradoxically, he may be without remedy if 
his employer fired him for his sexual orientation.35 The most burning 
question of course is how the law will develop in light of Obergefell and 
the EEOC’s decision in Baldwin v. Foxx that sexual orientation is pro-
tected from employment discrimination under Title VII.36 
 Section II of this Note discusses the state of the law regarding 
whether sexual orientation is a protected status under Title VII; Sec-
tion III examines the state of the modern workplace and predicts how 
it will react to recent developments in the law; Section IV addresses 
potential avenues of legal development in the area of sexual orienta-
tion harassment; Section V concludes. 
II.   WHAT CONSTITUTES TITLE VII SEX DISCRIMINATION? 
 Title VII states that:  
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . .  
 to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or  
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to  
his . . . sex . . . or . . . 
 to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any in-
dividual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .37 
                                                                                                                                 
 34. See Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, at 15 (July 15, 2015), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120133080.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8PZ-PCJA]. 
 35. See Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35. 
 36. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-03 (2015) (holding that same-sex 
marriage bans violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses); Baldwin, EEOC Ap-
peal No. 0120133080, supra note 34, at 15 (deciding that sexual orientation discrimination 
is prohibited under Title VII).  
 37. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2012). 
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Courts have established that every class in Title VII is equally pro-
tected; there is no order or preferential treatment of one class over an-
other.38 In order to succeed in a Title VII employment discrimination 
claim, an employee must show that he or she was a member of a pro-
tected class and that the employer’s hiring or employment practices 
had a disparate impact on the employee as a member of that class.39 If 
the employee succeeds in showing this, the burden shifts to the em-
ployer to show that it had a legitimate reason for the decision.40 If the 
employer successfully meets this burden, then summary judgment 
may be granted in his or her favor unless the plaintiff can proffer some 
evidence that reasonably shows prohibited discrimination.41 The ques-
tion of whether or not an employment practice creates a disparate im-
pact is obviously a fact-intensive, case-specific inquiry. Courts have 
taken several different approaches in establishing tests to determine 
whether the plaintiff and the class to which it belongs has truly suf-
fered an injury from disparate employment practices,42 some of which 
constitute downright victim-blaming.43  
 The sex clause of Title VII—disregarding the fact that it uses mas-
culine pronouns for a class that necessarily involves a binary distinc-
tion—is especially murky, and has led to uncertainty as to what ex-
actly Congress sought to protect in enacting Title VII. The dominant 
rhetoric used in judicial opinions is that the clause against discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex is to be seen as prohibiting discriminatory treat-
ment based on sex and gender.44 However, there is much debate about 
what exactly constitutes sex and gender discrimination.45  
                                                                                                                                 
 38. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that the committee 
report regarding Title VII asserts that all classes should be given equal protection  
from discrimination). 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 40. Dawson, 398 F.3d at 216. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, No. L-113-08, 2014 WL 2894924, at *4-5 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. June 27, 2014) (using the McDonnell Douglas test). But see Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-81 (1998) (noting that there are many dif-
ferent approaches to deciding sex discrimination under Title VII, and deciding to use a  
totality of circumstances approach in deciding whether a workplace is to the point of  
discriminatory circumstances). 
 43. Dawson, 373 F.3d at 271 (citing the lower court’s sentiment that a sensitive female 
correctional officer is clearly not suited for her work and a woman must expect embarrass-
ment and harassment while working in a prison environment). 
 44. See Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., No. 3:12-cv-1154 (SRU), 2016 WL 1089178, at *4 
(D. Conn. Mar. 18, 2016); Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, supra note 34, at 5.  
 45. See Smith, 2014 WL 2894924, at *4. But see Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-81; Schultz, 
supra note 2, at 2090-93 (discussing the various approaches that corporations take to avoid 
sexual harassment claims due to the ambiguity of sexual harassment law). 
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 Title VII does not define sex or gender; rather, it offers a non-ex-
haustive list of sex characteristics (primarily pertaining to women) 
when defining what constitutes discrimination in terms of sex. 46 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “sex” as “[t]he sum of the peculiarities 
of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female organ-
ism.”47 Black’s defines “gender-based harassment” as “[h]arassment 
motivated by hostility and intended to enforce traditional heterosexual 
norms and roles and discourage what is seen as nontraditional behav-
ior.”48 It distinguishes gender-based harassment from gender discrim-
ination, which it categorizes as sex discrimination that is especially 
geared towards women.49 In the statutory definition, Black’s also es-
tablishes that there is an intermediate-scrutiny standard of review for 
sex (and gender) discrimination claims, meaning that discriminatory 
practices “must serve an important governmental interest and be sub-
stantially related to the achievement of that objective.”50 It goes on to 
distinguish sex and gender by saying that “[g]ender refers to the psy-
chological and societal aspects of being male or female; sex refers spe-
cifically to the physical aspects.”51 This is incredibly vague language 
for any judge or employer who wishes to better understand what it 
means to discriminate based on gender.  
 Although the case involved racial discrimination, McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green lays the groundwork for all Title VII discrimination 
actions by establishing a four-part test:  
(i) that [the claimant] belongs to a [class] minority; (ii) that he ap-
plied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking 
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and 
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the em-
ployer continued to seek applicants . . . .52  
In the line of cases following McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court 
has incrementally expanded the scope of the sex clause of Title VII to 
make for a plaintiff-friendly body of law. Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson held that sexual harassment claims are actionable as discrim-
inatory under Title VII if they amount to a hostile environment.53 The 
Court relied on the EEOC decision Griggs v. Duke Power Co. to expand                                                                                                                                  
 46. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
 47. Sex, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 48. Gender-Based Harassment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 49. Sex Discrimination, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 53. 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986). 
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Title VII sex discrimination to include sexual harassment.54 Vinson is 
distinguishable from McDonnell Douglas in that the Court did not look 
at a distinct employment action or decision—like hiring, firing, or af-
fecting pay (although the plaintiff’s cause of action did stem from her 
termination)—but rather, the Court looked at the subjective interac-
tions between the plaintiff and defendant and the conditions of the 
workplace to decide whether a reasonable person would find it to be 
hostile.55 The Court noted that an economic or tangible impact was not 
necessary to have a cause of action for discrimination.56 As Justice 
Scalia noted in his concurrence in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., this 
“objectively hostile” work environment standard, with no requirement 
that there be a tangible disadvantage, is incredibly vague; it basically 
leaves the legal question of whether sexual harassment amounts to sex 
discrimination under Title VII to a jury.57 
 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., which determined 
that same-sex harassment is a form of sex discrimination under Title 
VII, has set the stage for litigation on the matter of sexual orientation 
as a protected status under Title VII.58 The Court in Oncale quelled a 
discrepancy in the law about whether sexual desire for the victim is a 
necessary component of a sexual harassment claim—in short, the an-
swer is no.59 The Court attempted to respond to Justice Scalia’s dis-
pleasure with the subjectivity of the sexual harassment standard by 
noting that the plaintiff must show, by whichever route preferable, 
that the alleged conduct was not just offensive, but was actually dis-
criminatory because of sex.60 The Court also noted that a reasonable 
jury could distinguish between teasing behavior and conduct that 
amounts to hostility or abuse from the plaintiff’s perspective.61 Pre-
sumably because the aggressors and the victim were of the same sex-
ual orientation, the Court did not address whether sexual orientation 
was protected under the sexual discrimination clause of Title VII.62 
                                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. at 65 (explaining that the EEOC found that sexual harassment is a form of  
sex discrimination). 
 55. Id. at 64-67. 
 56. Id. at 64.  
 57. 510 U.S. 17, 24 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 58. 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998). 
 59. Id. at 80. 
 60. Id. at 81. 
 61. Id. at 82. 
 62. See id. at 80-81 
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A.   Is Sexual Orientation Protected Under Title VII? 
 The Baldwin opinion holds that discrimination against an employee 
for preferring the same sex is a form of gender discrimination.63 The 
logic is that an employer is treating an employee unequally based on 
his or her counter-normative sexual preference (for example, a gay 
man being discriminated against because he prefers to be romantically 
involved with other men). The EEOC considers this to be sex discrim-
ination under Title VII because if the man were a woman who was 
attracted to men, she would not have been discriminated against.64 
The EEOC clarified that the question of whether sexual orientation is 
protected by Title VII is not answered by looking to the language of 
the statute, but rather “whether the agency has ‘relied on sex-based 
considerations’ or ‘take[n] gender into account’ when taking the chal-
lenged employment action.”65 The exception to this standard is when 
discrimination is legitimized by an occupation that requires one sex’s 
set of skills.66 A second argument the EEOC posits for including sexual 
orientation discrimination in Title VII is that it is a form of association 
discrimination, or discrimination based on the employee’s association 
with a particular group of people, which the EEOC points out is con-
sistently protected with regards to interracial dating and friend-
ships.67 
 It is important to note that the EEOC, while having authority over 
employers who have at least fifteen regular employees,68 is an agency, 
and agency decisions are subject to appeal.69 Appellate courts have 
uniformly refused to accept that Title VII protects sexual orientation, 
and they rely on the fact that Congress has refused to incorporate sex-
ual orientation into Title VII despite several proposals to do so.70 It 
appears that sexual orientation as a protected status is in a legal 
limbo. President Obama issued an Executive Order in 2014 that 
amended two prior Executive Orders by adding sexual orientation and                                                                                                                                  
 63. Baldwin, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, supra note 34, at 15.  
 64. Id. at 6. 
 65. Id. at 5-6 (footnote omitted). 
 66. Id. at 6 n.5. 
 67. Id. at 8. 
 68. Coverage of Business/Private Employers, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/coverage_private.cfm [https://perma.cc/Y6S2-JJ9G] (noting 
that, to be considered, employees must be employed for at least twenty weeks); see also Cov-
erage, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/ 
coverage.cfm [https://perma.cc/2T2Q-5QRC]. 
 69. Appeals, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/types-cases/appeals 
[https://perma.cc/L5VF-48L6]. 
 70. Kiley v. Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 296 Fed. Appx. 107, 109 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
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gender identity as protected classes against which the federal govern-
ment cannot discriminate.71 The administrative state, while widely ac-
cepted as legitimate, is the result of a quasi-constitutional compromise 
that came about during the New Deal.72 Administrative bodies’ powers 
are paradoxical because they are created through legislation (each 
agency is created and governed by a statute), but the executive branch 
appoints agency heads and the administrative state has the power to 
make rules, regulate, prosecute, and adjudicate. Agencies are given 
broad discretion to conduct their affairs as they see fit with a low 
standard of judicial review.73 This confers the powers of all three gov-
ernmental branches to an entity that is not democratically accounta-
ble, which is contrary to the system of checks and balances achieved 
through the separation of powers in the federal government.74  
 If the EEOC, Congress, and the courts were aligned in their views 
about the protection of sexual orientation in employment law, then 
this distinction would be trivial; however, Congress appears to be op-
posed to, or at least ambivalent about, including sexual orientation in 
Title VII.75 In addition, only one court to date has read sexual orienta-
tion into the language of Title VII,76 perhaps because courts are uncer-
tain about the intent of the legislature. The picture with which we are 
now faced, to which everyone who has a job or is seeking one is subject, 
is that the executive branch would like to include sexual orientation 
and ‘gender identity’ as a protected class in employment law—a frus-
tratingly ambiguous term without any promulgated definition—while 
the legislative branch will not further define the sex clause of Title VII, 
and the judiciary refuses to accept sexual orientation as a protected 
class at the appellate level. The population is getting three very differ-
ent messages from the government, and to complicate the matter fur-
ther, the Supreme Court has been steadily expanding the scope of the 
sex clause of Title VII.77 The Obergefell decision will make same-sex 
marriage more prevalent and same-sex relationships will become more                                                                                                                                  
 71. Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 21, 2014). 
 72. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
421, 424-25 (1987). 
 73. For an overview of the different standards of judicial review implemented in the 
administrative context, see id. at 463-74.  
 74. Id. at 446-47. 
 75. As indicated by the lack of legislation to amend Title VII to include sexual orientation. 
 76. Memorandum Order at 8, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Scott Med. 
Health Ctr., 2:16-cv-00225-CB (W.D. Penn. Nov. 4, 2016), ECF No. 48, 
http://files.eqcf.org/cases/216-cv-00225-48/ [https://perma.cc/GHK3-RXNC] (“The Court 
holds Title VII’s ‘because of sex’ provision prohibits discrimination on the basis of  
sexual orientation.”).  
 77. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998); Meritor Sav. Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
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visible in the workplace in the coming years without any current safe-
guards against discrimination in the private sector. While Obergefell 
is the most progressive decision the Supreme Court has made regard-
ing sexual orientation, it is largely based in policy and does not have a 
strong foundation in legal precedent. The decision also does not ad-
dress employment law, but simply looks at the right of individuals to 
marry.78 The Court decided to frame the right of marriage as a funda-
mental liberty interest instead of an equal protection issue, thus 
providing little guidance on the issue of sexual orientation as a pro-
tected class.79 The political climate and the lack of judicial support for 
sexual orientation as a protected status set a dubious tone for everyone 
in the workforce. 
 Using the same Baldwin logic,80 the EEOC has recently decided 
several cases in favor of employees regarding disparate treatment due 
to their sexual orientation; however, these decisions are limited in 
their binding effect.81 Interestingly, Baldwin does not address whether 
sexual orientation is being classified as a mutable characteristic; how-
ever, the EEOC’s position that sexual orientation discrimination is sex 
discrimination because doing so necessarily considers sex may indicate 
that sexual orientation is considered immutable. 82  Discrimination 
based on mutable characteristics such as hair length/style, dress, and 
sometimes weight is not protected under Title VII.83 The common cor-
porate practice of restricting or eliminating sexuality by labeling it 
sexual harassment may make sexuality seem like a mutable charac-
teristic, but—as common experience tells us—sexuality is a part of our 
identity, which is hard to change, and it can be quite difficult for some 
people to conceal their sexuality. In a place where people spend forty-
hours per week for roughly thirty years, it is practically impossible not                                                                                                                                  
 78. The Court provided four principles for extending marriage to same-sex couples: (i) 
“the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual au-
tonomy[;]” (ii) the right to marriage is fundamental because it is a unique union unrivaled 
in importance to married people; (iii) marriage is fundamental for familial stability and chil-
drearing; and (iv) marriage is a cornerstone of tradition and social order. Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599-2601 (2015).  
 79. See id. at 2598.  
 80. See Baldwin, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, supra note 34, at 6-9. 
 81. What You Should Know About EEOC and the Enforcement Protections for LGBT Work-
ers, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/ enforcement_protections_lgbt_workers.cfm#examples [https://perma.cc/CFW9-9EHC].  
 82. See Baldwin, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, supra note 34, at 6.  
 83. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004) (reasoning 
that Congress did not intend for mutable traits to be afforded protection under Title VII); 
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 11 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1143 
(S.D. Ala. 2014) (stating that hairstyles are mutable characteristics and therefore have no 
protection against discrimination).  
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to get to know co-workers on a personal level; personal details like va-
cations, spousal conversations, and dates are pervasive in the work-
place. There has been overt hostility in the workplace towards people 
who do not conform to gender norms, and they often feel that they can-
not share elements of their personal lives with their co-workers.84 If 
sexual orientation discrimination were protected under Title VII, peo-
ple who endure such pervasive and systematic hostility would clearly 
have to go beyond showing that the behavior is offensive, and establish 
that it actually results in disparate treatment—a vague standard that 
has been in contention for years.85 What exactly does it look like to 
bring a successful claim for sexual orientation discrimination?  
III.   THE FUTURE OF THE WORKPLACE 
 Grace Wong, in a piece titled One Job, Two Lives: LBGT in the 
American Workplace, highlights some difficulties that “closet[ed]” gay 
and transgendered men face in the workplace.86 These men explain 
how hard it is for them to share simple things at work, like vacations 
they took with their respective significant others, because they do not 
want to risk the discovery of their sexual orientation and thus experi-
ence poor treatment.87 A transgender man, Brandon, even postulated 
that those employers to whom he chose to disclose his gender transi-
tion discriminated against him in the hiring process.88 He applied to 
twenty different companies and was only offered a job by the one to 
which he did not disclose his transition.89 It may seem like these men 
are imagining or exaggerating the hostility of their work environment, 
but a recent study entitled Pride and Prejudice: Employment Discrim-
ination Against Openly Gay Men in the United States validates their 
hesitation to “come out” in the workplace.90 
                                                                                                                                 
 84. See Tara Siegel Bernard, Fired for Being Gay? Protections Are Piecemeal, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/01/your-money/protections-for-gays-
in-workplace-are-piecemeal.html [https://perma.cc/RX3Q-X8SJ] (explaining that many peo-
ple in the LBGTQ community experience social isolation at work from fear of being harassed 
or fired for sharing their personal lives).  
 85. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing the many different approaches 
that courts have taken in deciding what constitutes sexual harassment under Title VII).  
 86. See Grace Wong, One Job, Two Lives: LBGT in the American Workplace, CNN 
(Oct. 30, 2014, 4:46 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/30/us/gays-lgbt-corporate-america/ 
[https://perma.cc/94E8-TLA6]. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. András Tilcsik, Pride and Prejudice: Employment Discrimination Against Openly 
Gay Men in the United States, 117 AM. J. SOC. 586, 586-87 (2011) (finding that there is a 
pattern of discrimination against gay men in the workplace). 
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 This data highlights a dichotomy between closeted gay men and 
openly gay men in the workplace. However, there are other categories 
of counter-normative individuals who have a harder time choosing 
when and how to disclose their sexuality. Schultz touches on the phe-
nomenon of men and women who do not conform to pervasive gender 
stereotypes.91 These individuals may be straight or anywhere on the 
LBGTQ spectrum, but are perceived by their mannerisms and inter-
actions with others to be of a counter-normative sexual orientation. As 
demonstrated in an episode of The Office, there can be a significant 
amount of banter regarding an individual’s sexuality.92 Individuals 
who apparently do not conform to gender norms can be singled out and 
subjected to this banter to the point that it constitutes a hostile work 
environment.93 These individuals are in an awkward position in the 
workplace because they may not feel comfortable disclosing their sex-
uality or asking their co-workers to stop with the jokes.  
 There are two apparent approaches that employers can take in re-
sponse to Baldwin and Obergefell—a strict ‘don’t ask, don’t tell,’ zero-
tolerance policy regarding sexuality in the workplace,94 or a more sys-
tematic, integrative restructuring of heteronormative corporate struc-
tures to reduce the feeling of hostility that counter-normative individ-
uals may feel and to curb potential sexual orientation discrimination 
or sexual harassment claims against them. The current appellate law 
regarding sexual orientation discrimination and harassment seems to 
incentivize the first approach,95 while Baldwin and Obergefell give em-
ployers reason to pause and examine their business model in anticipa-
tion of future decisions that could create a cause of action for private 
sexual orientation discrimination or harassment. 
A.   Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 
 The most empirically supported and popular approach to avoid po-
tential sexual harassment or sex discrimination claims is to simply                                                                                                                                  
 91. Schultz, supra note 2, at 2142, 2160-62 (explaining that in male-dominated work 
environments, men and women who do not conform to traditional stereotypes are often har-
assed by dominant male workers because they threaten their self-image; also showing that 
co-workers are more likely to perceive otherwise acceptable interactions as sexual harass-
ment from openly gay coworkers). 
 92. The Office: Gay Witch Hunt (NBC television broadcast Sept. 1, 2006) (depicting a 
slur being directed towards a closeted gay co-worker whose sexual orientation is uncertain). 
 93. Kristin M. Bovalino, Comment, How the Effeminate Male Can Maximize His Odds 
of Winning Title VII Litigation, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1117, 1120-21 (2003) (describing  
research about stereotyping and gender profiling in the workplace and how it can have  
negative effects). 
 94. Schultz, supra note 2, at 2099. 
 95. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005) (rejecting a gender 
stereotyping claim that has been used to “bootstrap” sexual orientation to Title VII protection). 
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stifle sexual expression in the workplace;96 employees are encouraged 
not to date, share their personal lives, use profane language, make 
suggestive comments, or joke about sexual topics with other employ-
ees.97 Similarly, there are de facto employment norms in place that in-
centivize LBGTQ employees or job seekers against revealing their sex-
ual orientation in fear of being discriminated against or harassed.98 
The rationale behind this approach is that the murky law regarding 
sexual harassment that rises to the level of an actionable claim of sex 
discrimination is like lightning: it is unpredictable, but when it strikes, 
it is severe.99 
 This policy also has backing because it comports with rational busi-
ness theorists and feminist ideologists who postulate that sexuality 
has no business in the workplace because it leads to inefficiency and, 
according to some feminists, creates an environment oppressive to 
women because of the male-dominated nature of most workspaces.100 
Optimistically, this strict standard of keeping sexuality out of the 
workplace is designed with the employee in mind, so that employers 
can prevent unwelcomed advances from co-workers and supervisors. 
However, in execution, a zero-tolerance policy against any form of sex-
uality in the workplace creates a strict liability standard similar to the 
Salem Witch Trials where employees can point to behavior as innocu-
ous as observing one employee comforting another and claim that they 
feel harassed or offended by the behavior. Employers then are quick to 
act and usually end up severely reprimanding or firing the offending 
parties.101 The employers are incentivized to punish the alleged offend-
ers to avoid claims against them for condoning sexual harassment or 
sex discrimination, and the employees are largely at-will102 with little 
protection from the disciplinary actions that their employers take. It 
also has a tendency to isolate the sexes, which can be damaging to 
women’s chances for promotion because they are typically overrepre-
sented in lower-level positions.103 Cynically, as Schultz’s research sug-
gests, employers sometimes use their harassment policies as a sword, 
                                                                                                                                 
 96. See, e.g., supra note 5.  
 97. Schultz, supra note 2, at 2099. 
 98. See id. at 2142, 2160-62 (explaining how the structure and heteronormative environ-
ment of most businesses creates an inhospitable situation for people of alternative gender iden-
tities and sexual orientations); Tilcsik, supra note 90, at 586 (describing the regional employ-
ment practices of discriminating against applicants who indicate that they are homosexual). 
 99. Schultz, supra note 2, at 2086.  
 100. Id. at 2072-75. 
 101. See id. at 2160-62. 
 102. See id. at 2104-07. 
 103. Id. at 2132, 2135. 
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getting rid of employees that don’t fit in or who are close to retirement 
or avoiding costly promotions.104 
B.   The Integrated Workplace 
 Schultz criticizes modern human resources representatives for tak-
ing the aforementioned approach to treat the symptoms by stamping 
out sexuality, rather than focusing on de facto sex segregation in the 
workplace.105 She goes on to explain that in male-dominated work-
places, counter-normative men are often subject to harassment by 
straight men and women can see other women as competition for male-
supervisor attention, turning them against each other in the work-
place.106 She points to anecdotal evidence to argue that more inte-
grated environments lead to more productive employees and make in-
teractions less hostile; she says that in workplaces like these, “sex har-
assment virtually ceases to be a problem.”107 
 Although sexual orientation, especially if it can be deemed mutable, 
may not be analogous to sex in terms of workplace integration, 
Schultz’s logic may be promising for employees who are fearful about 
revealing their sexual orientation at work. In more integrated environ-
ments where people are open about their sexual orientation at all lev-
els of the organization, there would logically be a less hostile environ-
ment. Hostile treatment of people of alternative sexual orientations 
would abate because the aggressors would presumably have co-work-
ers and supervisors that they knew were of the same sexual orienta-
tion and who would take offense to such harassment. Aggression 
would no longer be directed at specific targets, but rather at behavior 
that could potentially alienate the entire workplace against the ag-
gressors. Schultz notes a rather extreme example of this logic in dis-
cussing the work environment of the magazine Womyn.108 This is an 
environment composed exclusively of women who encourage sexually 
charged conversations and interactions because they purport that em-
ployees are not just co-workers, but sisters.109 While this workplace is 
not sexually integrated,110 it serves as a good example of how employ-
ees who do not feel like minorities, tokens, or ‘others’ will be more com-
fortable at work and therefore will be far less likely to feel sexually 
harassed or offended by the conduct of others.                                                                                                                                  
 104. Id. at 2104-07. 
 105. Id. at 2136-40. 
 106. Id. at 2143. 
 107. Id. at 2144. 
 108. Id. at 2145-47. 
 109. Id. at 2145. 
 110. Id. at 2146. 
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 While Schultz’s proposal to integrate workplaces to make them 
more equal and welcoming is ideal in practice, it would take a system-
atic restructuring of human resources training, arbitration policies, in-
centive plans, and hiring practices for employers nationwide. Heter-
onormative ideology is still the norm in society and the workplace.111 
There would certainly be backlash among employers and employees, 
and there may even be a new class of claims for reverse sexual orien-
tation discrimination as employers give preference to applicants with 
counter-normative sexual orientations in the hiring process in an at-
tempt to integrate their workplaces and get ahead of any claims of sex-
ual orientation discrimination. As it stands, courts have considered 
claims against harassment based on a person’s counter-normative gen-
der, but they refuse to validate related claims about sexual orientation 
discrimination.112 With the exception of a few unique workplaces, the 
uncertainty that Obergefell and Baldwin cast on the legal status of 
sexual orientation under Title VII will likely cause employers to buckle 
down and continue to police sexuality for fear of being liable for dis-
crimination. This would give employers yet another tool with which to 
dismiss employees that they simply want to let go: they could just 
claim that the employee was being hostile towards a co-worker of a 
different sexual orientation. Conversely, employers may not adapt 
their employment practices at all and, in light of Obergefell, may sub-
ject people of alternative sexual orientation to increased hostility and 
future sexual harassment claims for otherwise innocuous behavior af-
ter revealing that they are of an alternative sexual orientation. It is 
these individuals who are truly in a paradox in the workplace and 
could benefit from legislation clarifying what sexual orientation dis-
crimination looks like under Title VII. 
IV.   POTENTIAL LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 
 Somewhat of a legal quagmire surrounds the issue of sexual orien-
tation.113 Since it has not yet gained firm footing as a protected status 
under Title VII, it is not clear whether sexual orientation is a mutable 
                                                                                                                                 
 111. See Jane Ward & Beth Schneider, The Reaches of Heteronormativity: An Introduc-
tion, 23 GENDER AND SOC’Y 433, 437-38 (2009) (noting the insidious effects that pervasive 
heteronormativity has on all facets of life in American culture). But see Human Rights Cam-
paign, CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2018 2 (analyzing the trend towards acceptance of 
LBGTQ culture in corporate policies despite “all out assaults . . . from the highest levels  
of government”).  
 112. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005) (rejecting a gender 
stereotyping claim that has been used to “’bootstrap’” sexual orientation to Title VII protec-
tion); Bovalino, supra note 93, at 1118-20. 
 113. See supra Section II.A.  
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characteristic. Unlike haircuts, make-up, and weight, sexual orienta-
tion is a characteristic that does not have any one indicator. It is also 
not obvious whether it changes over time and, if it does, the degree of 
control that we have over it.114 It is often difficult to determine a per-
son’s sexual orientation based on outward characteristics and casual 
interactions. Some heterosexual individuals may be presumed to be 
LBGTQ by behavior unrelated to sexuality that places them in that 
category based on the observer’s stereotypes and past experiences.115 
However, presuming that sexual orientation is a part of sexuality, 
some employers treat it as if it is a mutable, or at least concealable, 
trait by disallowing its expression at work.116 It is odd that gender ste-
reotype discrimination—treating employees poorly because of per-
ceived deviations from gender norms—is actionable but sexual orien-
tation discrimination is not; it is very hard to separate those two con-
cepts. Non-conforming men and women in the workplace are usually 
thought to be gay and are treated as such.  
 Schultz proposes a sliding scale burden of proof that correlates with 
the level of integration that an employer achieves.117 That is, the more 
integrated the workplace, the higher the standard of proof that the 
plaintiff must show in a claim for sexual harassment.118 The same logic 
can be applied to sexual orientation. She also suggests providing peo-
ple who bring sexual harassment causes of action the presumption 
that the complained-of behavior was sufficiently severe.119 This would 
make frivolous or vindictive sexual harassment claims easier to file, 
and it would increase the expense of litigation. While Schultz’s ap-
proach could easily be applied to sexual orientation discrimination 
claims, it does not address the fact that it is easier for employers to 
just outright ban interactions of a sexual nature to avoid liability. Un-
der Schultz’s model, employers with more segregated work environ-
ments would be incentivized to further isolate sexes to try to avoid sex-
ual harassment claims. Schultz claims that her approach, as it is 
                                                                                                                                 
 114. See Schultz, supra note 2, at 2138 (“At the simplest level, theorists caution, sexual-
ity is not a biological essence that resides in an individual’s body, but is instead a relational 
phenomenon that is created within social networks.”). 
115. Id. (“[S]exuality cannot even be understood to be embodied in a specific activity or set 
of practices, but is instead a ‘diverse and diffuse process’ that managers and employees ac-
tively construct within the larger constraints of organizational structure.”). 
 116. See Dawson, 398 F.3d at 215(describing the alleged comments that the lesbian 
plaintiff endured at her workplace about her appearance and attitude, including that she 
needed to have sex with a man); Baldwin, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, supra note 34, at 
11-12; Schultz, supra note 2, at 2142, 2160-62. 
 117. Schultz, supra note 2, at 2172-75. 
 118. Id. at 2174-76. 
 119. Id. at 2175. 
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geared towards sexual harassment that does not include sexual orien-
tation, would not require legislation.120 However, many courts refuse 
to find sexual orientation as a protected status.121 So, for the purposes 
of addressing sexual orientation discrimination and harassment, leg-
islation is likely needed. 
 The most obvious reason for courts’ hesitation to read sexual orien-
tation into Title VII is that, according to the legislative history, the sex 
clause was added at the last minute in an attempt to keep the legisla-
tion from being passed entirely.122 The climate of the legislature at the 
time of Title VII’s enactment was such that it was not laughable to 
attempt to defeat a bill guaranteeing freedom from discrimination in 
employment by adding women as a protected class.123 It is no wonder 
that there is little elaboration as to what the sex clause means in Title 
VII. Some argue that Congress’s failure to adopt proposed amend-
ments to Title VII aimed at expanding the sex clause to sexual orien-
tation is an indication that it does not intend for sexual orientation to 
be protected.124 However, it is telling that the EEOC—a product of the 
administrative state, which was designed to be more efficient than the 
legislature—and the executive branch have both come to the conclu-
sion that sexual orientation should be a protected status in employ-
ment law.125 Obergefell was a big step forward for the private rights of 
same-sex couples. The legal landscape is ideal for a focus on legislation 
that would grant sexual orientation protected status under Title VII. 
Before this year, LBGTQ interest groups were diffuse in their focus; 
considerable efforts were geared toward the judiciary as a mechanism 
through which same-sex couples could be granted rights privately, 
through marriage equality, and in the work place.126 Now, however, 
these groups can focus on lobbying the legislature to amend Title VII.  
 It may be that the most practical legal avenue in light of the current 
legal status of sexual orientation in the workplace is to frame sexual 
orientation discrimination under the theory of gender stereotyping dis-
crimination.127 As Bovalino notes, men who are perceived to be effem-
inate and are discriminated against or harassed in the workplace have 
viable claims for gender discrimination under Title VII; however, their                                                                                                                                  
 120. Id. at 2181. 
 121. See Wong, supra note 86 (noting that, as of 2014, employers could legally discrimi-
nate against gay workers in twenty-nine states).  
 122. Bovalino, supra note 93, at 1122-23. 
 123. See id. 
 124. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 125. Baldwin, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, supra note 34, at 15; Exec. Order No. 
13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 21, 2014). 
 126. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 127. See Bovalino, supra note 93, at 1118-20. 
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claims are less certain if they are perceived to be, or actually are, ho-
mosexuals because courts then think that they are trying to bootstrap 
a sexual orientation claim onto a gender discrimination claim.128 For 
some reason, gender-non-conforming women do not have such diffi-
culty in successfully bringing claims of gender discrimination or har-
assment.129 This is an interesting paradox, because the stereotypical 
homosexual male is thought to be effeminate. It appears that employ-
ers have an affirmative defense in response to discrimination and har-
assment claims brought by effeminate men, gay or not: that they are 
actual or perceived homosexuals and therefore are legally discrimi-
nated against on the basis of their sexual orientation. Essentially, if 
an individual felt discriminated against or harassed based on his or 
her sexual orientation, that person would have to file a claim for gen-
der harassment or discrimination and hope that the court does not bar 
it based on their actual or perceived homosexual orientation; in order 
to achieve justice and ensure that they are comfortable and safe in 
their own place of employment, these individuals would have to lie 
about who they are.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 The most apparent route for achieving the protected status of sex-
ual orientation under Title VII in the current legal atmosphere is to do 
so through legislation. Currently, private employers are free to dis-
criminate against or harass employees on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion. They can fire or mistreat employees with impunity as long as they 
stay within the scope of sexual orientation. Conceivably, if an employer 
did not have any policies against sexual harassment that would ban 
such behavior, they could condone slurs towards LBGTQ employees 
and prevent those employees from such practices as displaying pic-
tures of their families or talking about their personal lives. They could 
fire these employees for disclosing, overtly or inadvertently, their sex-
uality. Imagine being a person of an alternative sexual orientation and 
hearing your employer openly condemning your lifestyle with no po-
tential legal recourse for the discomfort and hostility that you would 
suffer as a result. While this is an extreme example, there are busi-
nesses that have blatantly refused to serve same-sex couples;130 while 
this is not discriminatory against employees, it is hard to imagine that 
it would not make LBGTQ employees feel uncomfortable and poten-
tially harassed or discriminated against at work. It is hard to reconcile                                                                                                                                  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 1118. 
 130. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (considering 
the discriminatory conduct of a photography company refusing to photograph a same- 
sex wedding).  
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the fact that an applicant who is not hired because he or she does not 
conform to gender stereotypes has a legitimate Title VII claim, yet 
there is no legal recourse available for a person who does not conform 
to heteronormative beliefs about sexuality and is denied a job because 
of their counter-normative orientation.  
 The Court in McDonnell Douglas laid the groundwork for Title VII 
claims in stating that “[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minor-
ity or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed.”131 
Since that decision, courts have held that Title VII should apply to pro-
mote equality in the workplace and to ensure that every employee re-
mains free from “the ‘entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women in employment.’ ”132 The Baldwin court recognized that drawing 
a distinction between gender and sexual orientation discrimination is 
analogous to prohibiting racial discrimination but allowing for discrim-
ination based on an employee’s interracial relationships—a concept that 
it notes was stricken down.133 However, Oncale is the closest that the 
Supreme Court has come to deciding that sexual orientation is protected 
under Title VII.134 In that decision, the Court reasoned that the question 
of whether an environment amounts to discrimination is one that is left 
for the jury, and because the jury presumably has had work experience, 
its members will have an understanding that sexual harassment claims 
have a low, plaintiff-friendly threshold.135 
 With the momentum of Obergefell, Baldwin, and President 
Obama’s Executive Order, the legal atmosphere is primed for an ex-
pansion of Title VII so that employers and employees can have stable 
ground on which to stand when it comes to the increased presence of 
openly LBGTQ employees in the workplace. The current state of Title 
VII sex discrimination does not only affect members of the LBGTQ 
community; all participants in the workplace are subject to the seem-
ingly arbitrary and underdeveloped legal principle. It does not make 
sense to have a system whereby employees can be fired on a hair trig-
ger under the guise of sexual harassment (because it is a strict liability 
offense with no scienter requirement) for conduct that does not amount 
to harassment, but, by the same token, to deny a class of people the 
ability to bring legitimate sexual discrimination claims because of                                                                                                                                  
 131. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). 
 132. Anthony E. Varona & Jeffrey M. Monks, En/Gendering Equality: Seeking Relief 
Under Title VII Against Employment Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 7  
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 67, 92 (2000) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 
Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998)). 
 133. Baldwin, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, supra note 34, at 8.  
 134. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82 (holding that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable, 
and it does not have to be motivated by desire). But see Memorandum Order, supra note 76, 
at 8 (holding that the sex clause of Title VII applies to sexual orientation discrimination). 
 135. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. 
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their sexual orientation. The law needs clarity beyond a totality of cir-
cumstances approach; we need legislative qualification for what it looks 
like to be sexually harassed and discriminated against under Title VII. 
